active during the debate were Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Franz Neumann of the Frankfurt School; sociologists such as Floyd Allport and Talcott Parsons; and the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Their struggles reveal the general state of understanding about antisemitism at the very moment when its most deadly effects were being realized. Inherent in each of their differing approaches and positions on antisemitism was a certain naiveté about the origins, nature, and intensity of antisemitism in the United States. Similarly, much of what contributors argued about German antisemitism and the relationship of the German churches to the "Jewish Question" would not withstand the scrutiny of postwar scholarship. Some participants-perhaps the most misguided-failed either to perceive or to accept the ideologically driven genocidal motives and objectives of the Nazis.
The nature and significance of antisemitism, particularly in relationship to the Holocaust, remains a subject of enduring, often heated scholarly and popular debate. At issue are broader understandings of the rise of antisemitism, its relative weight in interpreting the perpetrators' behavior, and the role it played in determining the United States' response to the persecution and genocide of European Jewry. 2 Indeed, in light of the resurgence of antisemitism in various parts of the contemporary world, the subject remains highly relevant. 3 Some observers go so far as to assert the continuity between fascist antisemitism and currents in the contemporary Middle East that are sometimes labeled "Islamo-Fascism." 4 Although debates over antisemitism frequently had divided American Jews in the 1920s and 1930s, never had so many of the inherent issues and perspectives been brought together as they were in the researching and writing of Nazi Poison. Rarely have such candid views on the subject been solicited from so many different social and intellectual quarters. The process involved non-Jews as well as Jews, and native-born Jewish Americans as well as recent é migré intellectuals. The latter not only were victims of Nazi antisemitism, but also brought with them ideological and intellectual perspectives foreign to American culture. Other studies conducted before and during the war likewise grappled with competing perspectives on antisemitism. 5 But the archival documents regarding the creation of Nazi Poison provide unusual insight into behind-the-scenes attitudes and reveal nuances that only infrequently surface in public debates. Absent in the final publication, in fact, were critical comments about Jews made by certain prominent non-Jewish respondents; some of those comments themselves reeked of antisemitism. The hostile charges various Jewish groups launched against each other likewise remained hidden for half a century in the raw archival data.
* * *
In August 1940, prominent individuals from all walks of public life organized the Council for Democracy as an emergency initiative to raise Americans' awareness of the need to defend "self-government and human dignity" against despotic threats antisemitism as quite distinct from those they had experienced in Europe. America had offered Jews so much and held out even greater promise for the future. Its democratic values and institutions contrasted sharply with an antisemitism that appeared recent and alien, and was to be found primarily among society's discontents. Although in subsequent decades scholars would uncover a long history of widespread, indigenous American antisemitism, with characteristics comparable to those found elsewhere, some still identified aspects differentiating American antisemitism from that of other nations. 10 The inherent difficulty in studying, as well as dealing with, American antisemitism surfaced again in a 1961 survey of the scholarship to that date. Even after the Holocaust, the survey found, these methodologically sophisticated, thorough, and often empirically grounded studies yielded no consensus on the origins and nature of antisemitism.
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A substantial source of difficulty was the ambivalence surrounding the place of the Jewish American minority within the dominant Christian culture. Prejudice and discrimination coexisted with unprecedented opportunity and expansive legal rights. In this atmosphere, optimism comingled with anxiety. 12 A deep faith in the American progressive tradition led groups such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) to approach antisemitism as a set of civil rights issues pertaining to law and citizenship. To the AJC's leaders, the political and constitutional freedoms America afforded Jews proved the best defense against discrimination. For decades AJC leaders pursued this civil-rights approach aggressively. In their minds, Jews' assimilation and adherence to American ideals and laws would ensure their security in the United States. 13 But there was also unease, even fear, among Jewish Americans as they witnessed the rise of nativist antisemitism from the 1920s into World War II. Watching what was befalling the equally assimilated, constitutionally protected Jewish community in Germany heightened their anxiety appreciably. That large numbers of recent, unassimilated immigrant Jews were still regarded as undesirable "foreigners" added further complications. As the editors of Fortune noted in an influential, widely distributed 1936 book, formerly confident Jewish leaders had been "shocked into fear" by the Nazis' actions. The book not only tried to alleviate such fears but also warned that such anxiety could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Debunking the idea that Jews dominated American economic, media, or professional sectors, Fortune's editors self-assuredly downplayed the strength of antisemitic groups. They estimated the number of devout, activist antisemites to be only about 15,000 across the entire country. Similarly, they interpreted their own survey results as indicating that 84% of Americans would actively or passively oppose the antisemites. They thus concluded that "American anti-Semitism is feeble" and "not a present force." But, they argued, Jews could lose American sympathy if they did not put an end to "Jewish apprehensiveness" and to the "aggressive and occasionally provocative Jewish defense measures" that had been "disturbing" the rest of the country. 14 The book's reassuring, yet at the same time cautionary message was well suited to the legalistic, non-confrontational strategy of the American Jewish Committee. Moreover, it amounted to a categorical rejection of the activism of the Committee's chief rival, the American Jewish Congress, which, under the leadership of Rabbi Wise and others, had since 1933 organized mass protest rallies and boycotts targeted against Germany. In contrast to Germany's Jews, the Congress asserted, American Jews would not hesitate to contest anti-Jewish prejudices vigorously and publicly. This was the very "overreaction" that Fortune and the AJC had worried would place the "Jewish Question" on the national agenda, as the antisemites had sought to do, and possibly elicit a backlash against Jews for supposedly pursuing "Jewish" rather than "American" interests.
These issues became even more hotly contested in subsequent years, as the persecution of Jews in Europe intensified with the sweeping military conquests that brought millions of them under Nazi control. During this period, antisemitism appeared to increase across America. Contrary to Fortune's earlier optimism, William Dudley Pelley's "Silver Shirts" alone counted 15,000 members, while audiences estimated in the millions regularly tuned in to the antisemitic radio broadcasts of Father Charles Coughlin. Some 100,000 regularly read Reverend Gerald Winrod's Defender magazine, with its message of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. Public opinion polls indicated that three-fifths of Americans believed Jews had undesirable traits, with a majority actually favoring various legal and professional restrictions on Jews and 72% opposed to Jewish immigration. 15 By 1941, the subject of Jewish influence also had become an integral part of the passionate national debate over U.S. involvement in the war. Just as Nazi Poison was being completed, the issue was highlighted by Charles Lindbergh in his "America First" speech of September 11. For their own purposes, he proclaimed, Jews were pressuring America into an unnecessary, destructive war contrary to the welfare of the country. Each side in the internal struggle among Jewish organizations, and among their supporters within the broader public, viewed these events and facts through the lens of its own preconceived notions about antisemitism. For some, experience seemed to confirm the need for greater caution (though not inaction); for others, it appeared to demand more forceful engagement. All sides, however, continued to view antisemitism as an influence from abroad, despite the fact that a systematic 1941 study had concluded that American antisemitism was, in fact, an indigenous movement. Moreover, the study's author, Donald Strong, argued that the goals of antisemitic movements were not fascistic, though they might become so. Indeed, he argued, "anti-Semitism [had] taken root in the United States and . . . [could] no longer be treated as a transient phenomenon." He also warned that, in the event of war, Jews-the "perpetual alien minority"-could easily become a target of intensified nationalism: "Jews and revolutionaries would make excellent whipping boys for returning veterans," he wrote. 16 But Nazi Poison's contributors and editors either ignored or remained unaware of Strong's book. immigrant sociologist Isacque Graeber, they provided the most substantive analyses of the origins and causes of antisemitism. All three agreed that antisemitism was a complex phenomenon involving diverse causal factors rooted in history, economics, politics, religion, and psychology. But each of these theorists emphasized a different aspect of the problem. Parsons' participation not only added authority and prestige to the project but also brought personal insights and commitment. A descendent of Protestant colonists, Parsons was by heritage of old American stock but by education and attitude a modern progressive. He had become an early activist against fascism after observing the precipitous rise of Nazism as a graduate student in Germany. To him, antisemitism was "one of the most important symptoms of the socio-cultural malaise of the modern Western world." Rapid modernization and demographic transformations had produced what É mile Durkheim called anomie (insecurity and disorientation) for significant social sectors. Parsons wrote that "emancipated" areas of modern life (scientific rationalism, capitalism, freedom from religious and moral traditionalism) had undermined accepted normative values, behavioral patterns, and symbols so essential to traditional cultural stability.
Contributions of Social Scientists and Jewish Groups
The psychological reactions of the disoriented and increasingly insecure traditionalists were anxiety, exaggerated fear, and aggression. Parsons identified the urban lower-middle class as the group most susceptible to this anomie. Rather than recognize the true source of their problems, they "displaced" their insecurities onto the symbols of the threatening forces of emancipation. As a conspicuous minority group, Jews served as "particularly suitable symbols" for this displaced emotional reaction because they tended to associate themselves with the emancipated areas of society more strongly than did other "unassimilated" groups. Jews had a proclivity for "intellectualism" rather than accepted beliefs; they concentrated in the large cities identified with modernist currents; and, despite discrimination, were "strikingly economically successful" compared to other immigrants. In this situation, social tension and conflict between traditionalist and emancipated elements combined with "neurotic" psychological reactions to distort perceptions of the nature and behavior of Jews. Thus arose the paradox of Jews as symbols of both capitalism and Bolshevism-each an "international" force challenging traditionalist attitudes, especially in the context of nationalistic emotionalism. 17 However, Parsons believed that the emancipated areas of society were also susceptible to an insecurity that distorted their perception of the motives and beliefs of the traditionalists as "ignorant," "self-interested, etc." The conflict was intensified by the fact that opposition to antisemitism also was centered in the emancipated sectors of society, whose efforts to combat it provoked a neurotic reaction among the traditionalists, touching off a vicious cycle. Moreover, "considerable numbers of Jews" held attitudes that were themselves integral to the problem; Jews, too, were subject ("understandably") to neurotic reactions caused by the strains of the discrimination they suffered. "Hence," Parsons argued, "the impression of the aggressiveness and oversensitiveness to questions of prestige on the part of Jews are not altogether mythical-all of us probably know how difficult it is, with the best of will, to deal with certain oversensitive Jews." 18 Parsons' emphasis on the lower-middle class conformed to the existing notion that American antisemitism was a recent development and resided mainly among the discontented. He thus neglected the pervasiveness of the sentiment, especially among the educated elites who were decision-makers in America's response to the Holocaust. Similarly, in identifying Jewish behavior as a contributing factor in antisemitism, he echoed the themes raised earlier in Fortune's publication Jews in America. The fact that Parsons, a staunch ally of the Jews in the struggle against antisemitism, articulated such views about Jews (albeit privately) probably reflected a more widespread attitude within the intellectual community. Assumptions about the role of Jewish behavior also surfaced in Solomon Fineberg's 1943 monograph Overcoming Anti-Semitism, which essentially espoused the position of the American Jewish Committee. In his recommendations for combating antisemitism, he called for the elimination of those Jewish traits "which evoke[d] dislike and contumely." 19 That antisemitism was not limited to the discontented lower-middle class was certainly clear to Friedrich, Parsons' colleague at Harvard. Writing to a colleague about efforts to assist refugee scholars, Friedrich had said "it is not easy in view of the strong anti-Semitism of American universities." 20 Even scholars such as Floyd Allport, the father of experimental social psychology, retained in their theories elements of an earlier racial psychology as well as deep personal prejudices. 21 Allport asserted the intellectual superiority of the white race, and had rationalized lynchings as a necessary form of social control. In 1924, he had chided those social scientists reluctant to accept the results of army tests supposedly demonstrating the lower intelligence of immigrants. 22 In his response to Friedrich's questionnaire, Allport echoed Parsons' notion of a "vicious cycle" of suspicion and hostility to which Jews contributed. Jews, he asserted, generally failed to integrate themselves into the broader community or to work for its common interest. Maintaining a separate religion and "theories of race purity," unassimilated Jews retained their own group interests separate from those of the wider society. While there were no inherent or instinctual Jewish characteristics, those of "defensiveness, craftiness, and aggressiveness" were learned responses to discrimination and suspicion on the part of the dominant society. These, in turn, enhanced the negative responses of non-Jews. Allport went on to identify as the primary problem Orthodox Jews who fostered a strong sense of Jewish kinship and defensive, hostile tendencies toward outsiders. The rabbis in particular insisted on retaining the "fiction" of the "racial and religious purity" of Jews, he argued. With belief in a "separate Jewish race" ingrained since childhood, "mental conflict and perhaps neurosis" emerged among those Jews who attempted to assimilate fully into gentile culture. Although he conceded that assimilated Jews from non-orthodox families were no different culturally from non-Jews and bore none of the so-called "Jewish" traits, Allport maintained that Orthodox Jews perpetuated suspicions about Jews' loyalty to the country. 23 In stark contrast to Parsons and Allport, Graeber placed the responsibility for antisemitism on the dominant culture. At the same time, though, he reduced its burden by appealing to its beliefs and values. Born in Warsaw and educated at the Sorbonne in Paris, Graeber had immigrated to the United States in the late 1920s. Unlike his fellow sociologists in America, whose responses to antisemitism tended to reflect their current research theories, his perspectives were illuminated by his substantial knowledge of Jewish history. In the process of co-editing a volume on antisemitism at the time of the questionnaire, he was not only more historical and factual in his responses than they were, but he also unhesitatingly confronted one of the most perplexing dilemmas of the entire subject: the question of how to handle the delicate issue of Christian antisemitism without alienating Christian society. Decades of postwar studies subsequently would document the importance of medieval Christian prejudices against Jews in laying the foundation for modern antisemitism. They also would reveal European Protestant and Catholic churches' involvement with and/or indifference to Nazi antisemitism. But at the time, the problem was particularly vexing in an America that, despite its ideals of pluralism and a secular-humanistic public sphere, was deeply religious and sectarian. While some American Christian and Jewish groups sought understanding and reconciliation, the question of Christian antisemitism remained an irritant. The Fortune study had covered the question in a mere two paragraphs, dismissing "references to religious history [as] . . . mere rationalizations" for explaining antisemitism. 24 Graeber combined disturbing intellectual candor about his views on Christian culpability with conciliatory references to common Jewish/Christian values and endangered interests. The Church, he wrote, had dehumanized the Jew as "a 'monster,' a theological abstraction of superhuman cunning and malice." Even into modern times, Christians had been taught the "hostile myth of the cruel, greedy, treacherous, Christ-killing, Christ-rejecting Jew." Such instruction, he argued, "makes the child an anti-Semite in embryo. Once the damage is done, it is largely irreparable." Nonetheless, despite his view of religious antisemitism as the foundation of ingrained contemporary prejudice against Jews, Graeber believed that Nazi racial antisemitism had much broader motivations and objectives. For despite the history of religious prejudice and persecution, Christianity and Judaism were intertwined as the fundamental ethical premises of Western civilization. It was this culture-Western culture in its entirety-that the Nazis sought to destroy in the name of a barbaric, ancient, pagan tribalism. The Jew was merely the weakest point of attack in an assault against the Western principles of "liberty, reason, and justice." Thus modern antisemitism and Nazism were integral elements of the danger to the culture of the West. Graeber clearly implied that ingrained prejudices against Jews made Christians complicit in the destruction of their own cherished ideals and government through this surreptitious Nazi strategy. 25 For him, "true" Christianity was also the solution; but as Friedrich's project proceeded, it became clear that, to those fearing a negative reaction among Christians, Graeber had gone too far in delineating the sins of the past. One of the most uninhibited critics of the dominant culture was Miriam Beard Vagts, an author and the daughter of the famous historian Charles Beard. Though she was not as thorough or as scholarly as other respondents to the survey, her voice was certainly forceful. Her caustic assaults would survive the editorial process only in the form of brief, sanitized comments. The one significant exception was her depiction of antisemitism as an "emotional fantasy" that in fact had "precious little to do with Jews." The latter insight would emerge as a hallmark theme of the final version of Nazi Poison. To Vagts, the traits and behaviors attributed to Jews were mere rationalizations for a pre-existing hatred of Jews. Antisemitism was a "disease of the Gentiles" that erupted in times of crisis precipitated by the "breakdown of belief in existing institutions and mores." The most cynical of the respondents, Vagts doubted that education about the lofty ideal of the "dignity of man instead of materialism" would have much effect on the masses. The problem was too emotional to be solved by courses on tolerance, she believed. Education should therefore aim at teaching that "mankind is imperfect" and that "all men are worms in the sight of God." The old Calvinism, she suggested, "prepared the simple-minded better for a crisis by making them feel that some of their troubles could be their own fault"; no Calvinist would lay the blame on a minority group. 26 Confronting emotion-ridden and culturally ingrained stereotypes of Jews with the "psychological, social, and economic facts" was a primary objective of Friedrich's study. One of the key questions was whether Jews could be considered a "religion, race, or people." Although no one echoed Allport's assertion that Orthodox Jews perpetuated a fiction of a Jewish race, theologian Reinhold Niebuhr argued the converse. "I do not think we gain anything," he argued, "by the fiction that Jews are a religion rather than a race. I think it is a fiction with which the Jews fool themselves." As was the practice at that time, however, his usage of the term race connoted a cultural grouping rather than a hereditary biological entity: "[The Jews'] real problem is that they are a nation scattered among the nations." 27 The
American Jewish Congress agreed strongly that Jews were not bound together by their religion, which many, in any case, no longer practiced. Jews, wrote the drafters of the Congress's report, are a nationality similar to the English and French; they are united by "common origins and traditions, and in the view of the majority of the Jews of the world, they are part of a specific people-the Jewish people.
They are commonly referred to, colloquially speaking, as members of the Jewish race." 28 But the American Jewish Committee, with its decades-long promotion of assimilation, generally resisted classifying Jews as a separate nation. Richard Rothschild, the AJC's director of public education and information, continually emphasized that many American Jews had centuries-old roots in the country and shared a common background with other Americans. Jewish Americans differed "only in their religion," he wrote. 29 But even within the AJC this question was divisive. Considering the issue to be of "paramount significance," the AJC's Frank Trager argued that it would be absurd to deny the fact that "many Jews see themselves as a national group." Prominent Jews, he noted, had already acquainted the American public with the Jewish pursuit of a national home. 30 This was one of the few references anywhere in the responses alluding to Zionism, a subject that was, it appears, assiduously avoided.
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In the final version of the pamphlet, Friedrich and his colleagues tried to finesse the issue through careful wording. The pamphlet noted briefly that anthropologists had demonstrated that Jewish "bodily characteristics" were variable and thus that Jews were "united by religious tradition rather than race." At the same time, the Jews were "a people with a distinct culture, just as Irish or French-Canadians," and it would be un-American "to discriminate against a group on that ground." 32 Some of the most entrenched notions regarding the Jews related to their alleged "predominance" in economic and public life. Most of the Fortune study had been devoted to beliefs about Jewish "monopolization" of the economy, the professions, and the media. Given the cultural antisemitism of the day, such misconceptions took on crucial importance. This was clearly reflected in the questions posed by the Council for Democracy: "Are the Jews a favored class in the economic sphere? In what businesses do they predominate? Why? To what extent do they control the press, radio, theater? How influential are Jews in the Labor Unions? How many Jews are Communist Leaders? Are Jews predominant in the professions?" 33 Realizing that the highly charged assumptions inherent in these questions might in themselves be misconstrued to reinforce antisemitic misconceptions, Graeber suggested changing the term "predominant" to "occupational specialization" or "concentration." 34 Graeber pointed out that, like most ethnic groups, Jews tended to "concentrate" in certain professions. Tradition, he noted, had led Jews toward law and medicine in particular, while prejudice had excluded them from other professions. But even the statistics of such concentration could be deceiving. While approximately half of the lawyers in the New York area were Jewish, these worked mainly in the "minor aspects of legal work," such as general business, real estate, and domestic litigation. They were excluded from the more lucrative practices (insurance, banking, industry) by "anti-Jewish feelings in Christian firms," and their incomes were lower than the average. Nonetheless, by congregating in metropolitan areas, Jews "exacerbated the difficulties normally connected with Jewish participation in a crowded profession." A similar reaction against the disproportionate number of Jews entering medicine was likewise aggravated by the fact that Jewish medical professionals concentrated in cities and appeared to avoid smaller communities in dire need of doctors. The solution, Graeber argued, was not to curtail Jewish admission to medical school; however, Jewish doctors should be encouraged to "settle in such places where members of their own group do not exist in large numbers. This would eliminate some of the pressure from non-Jewish sources." Moreover, some of the "difficulties" might be alleviated if young Jews were to choose fields other than medicine or law.
This complex relationship between Jews, Christians ( particularly Catholics), and antisemitism further complicated attempts to universalize the question in terms of a struggle of Americans against un-American currents. Surprisingly, considering the extensive following and influence of Protestant antisemitic groups in America at the time, few contributors remarked on the subject. 35 Instead, the respondents generally concurred that Catholics, rather than co-targets of prejudice with Jews, were actually a font of antisemitism. This view probably resulted from what historians would later identify as the major fault line between Jews and Catholics. Since the early 1930s, the two groups had clashed over Latin America, the Spanish Civil War, and the country's response to European fascism. The divide was particularly acute on more immediate issues. Eighty percent of Catholics opposed the entry into the United States of more Jewish refugees; 61 percent of Catholic listeners approved of the speeches of Father Charles Coughlin, who dominated among antisemitic public figures in these years. 36 Coughlin's prominence was alarming. Not only did he reach millions with his weekly radio broadcasts, but he also disseminated his extremist messages through his widely read magazine Social Justice, which claimed 200,000 subscribers. He was America's greatest purveyor of the myth of a world-wide conspiracy of Jewish bankers and Communists as projected through the long-discredited Protocols of the Elders of Zion. He serialized the Protocols in his magazine. Long before Lindbergh did, Coughlin warned that Jews were secretly trying to force America into the war. For years, relentless efforts by Jews as well as prominent Catholics to silence him had failed because the Bishop of Detroit, Michael Gallagher, refused to intervene. Both Coughlin's popularity and the resonance of his ideas frightened the Jewish community; a quarter of Americans polled in 1938 agreed with his views. 37 That Coughlin enthusiastically endorsed the fascism of Mussolini and
Hitler as an alternative to a U.S. capitalist democracy certainly added credence to the argument that antisemitism was the result of foreign propaganda and a political instrument. Still, Coughlin's popularity clearly was not due to the "foreignness" of his ideas, as he had tapped the sentiments of large numbers of people by framing their fears, prejudices, and real problems in terms of their preexisting visions of both America and the Jews. Only in 1942, after he became too much of a liability in the midst of America's war against the fascist regimes he had lauded, did his new superior, Archbishop Edward Mooney, end his public career. Parsons felt that among the urban lower-middle class whom he had identified as the main source of antisemitism, "the Catholic elements [were] likely to be more susceptible because of the greater emphasis on traditionalism and hence suspicion of all things emancipated." Perceiving themselves as an oppressed minority excluded from the prestige of Anglo-Saxon culture, Catholics also were more likely to direct their aggression at Jews. He attributed Father Coughlin's success to these aspects of Catholic culture. 38 Similarly, the American Jewish Congress argued that anyone familiar with the issue would agree that "large sections of the Catholic Community in the United States" were involved in promoting antisemitism. The Congress openly blamed the Catholic Church hierarchy for its "unwillingness to touch the situation" despite the fact that it had the power to affect it greatly. "Some church leaders are indifferent to it and too large a number are helping to promote it," they argued in an October 1941 memorandum, whereas, they went on, no realistic solution could be pursued that neglected the crucial role the "Catholic Church must play in eradicating" antisemitism. 39 But the Congress offered no hint as to how the Church might be nudged in that direction. Eliot Janeway of Time perceived the roots of Christian antisemitism rather in a more socio-economic/political context, a view that had grave implications in the wartime environment. He believed that the fundamental economic transformations taking place in the United States seriously affected Protestants working in agriculture and Catholic labor, leaving both groups cynical about the war. Antisemitism had increased among the politically important Irish Catholics because they saw the current crisis as "a plot on the part of Anglophiles on Park Avenue and Jews to save England from an overdue fate." Neither did the agricultural sector believe that America was really endangered. And so long as both groups felt that America would be worse off after a war, antisemitism increased accordingly. The best way to overcome the skepticism of these groups and reduce antisemitism, Janeway believed, would be a publicity campaign that would "picture this war as the poor man's war for more." 40 Despite the contributors' conflicting opinions on the centrality and influence of psychology, religion, or economics, there was an underlying consensus. In one way or another, most framed the question in terms of American progressivism. Antisemitism emerged from the clash of modernist forces with traditionalism (Christian and/or Jewish). The ultimate goal of progressivism was the triumph of an enlightened modern society over reactionary attitudes, groups, and institutions. However, some of the most important thinkers Friedrich consulted stood outside that American mindset in terms of both personal experience and ideological orientation. To them, modernization was not the solution to antisemitism but its root cause. 41 Later severely criticized for neglecting antisemitism before the late 1930s, in 1941 the Frankfurt School published a detailed prospectus for a "Research Project on Anti-Semitism" that supposedly would remedy the ineffectiveness of previous attempts to solve the problem.
The Frankfurt School Perspective
Friedrich received some of the most theoretical analyses of antisemitism from recent German é migré intellectuals. Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Franz Neumann were leading figures in the Institute for Social Research at Columbia University. Known collectively as the Frankfurt School, this influential group fostered a Westernized humanistic-philosophical brand of Marxism they labeled Critical Theory. Yet within its integration of multi-disciplinary scholarship, especially Freudian psychology, there persisted the basic underlying Marxist principles of class conflict and economic forces.
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Earlier approaches had treated antisemitism as an atavistic aberration "foreign to the spirit of modern society," whereas these theorists asserted that it was "one of the dangers inherent in all more recent culture." Thus, they argued, one should focus less on the "statements of a Julius Streicher" and more on the source of modern culture-the Enlightenment. 43 Within a few years, Adorno and
Horkheimer would bring this idea to fruition in their controversial Dialectic of Enlightenment.
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In his response to the Council's questionnaire, Horkheimer again postulated the universality of antisemitism. In a manner reminiscent of Freud's in Civilization and Its Discontents, he wrote that it arose from those "primitive forces that breed under the cover of cultural domestication; it is repressed from time to time, but is never really overcome." Easier to activate in times of economic stress, "it is essentially possible everywhere." Though "deeply rooted in prehistoric humanity," violent instinctual urges had been fostered by civilization. Accordingly, in repressing primitive fears and instincts over the course of its cultural domestication of man, modern civilization had also created a "latent lust for cruelty and terror"-a lust projected against both weaker groups and the civilization that attempted to repress it. Historically, in any society, Jews had been both the weakest group and the greatest believers in civilization. They therefore became "the object par excellence of the repressed protest against civilization." But Horkheimer also invoked socio-economic factors with Marxist undertones. The urge to violence was preserved and reinforced by a modern society in which privileged social groups and "monopolistic interests" displaced individuals and denied them their rights. 45 While eschewing entirely Horkheimer's psychoanalytical thrust, Adorno's brief, less complex contribution also emphasized monopoly capitalism. German antisemitism, he argued, emerged in the nineteenth century among that segment of the bourgeoisie whose economic interests were tied to imperialism, and among small businessmen threatened by the rise of "huge monopolies." 46 The most elaborate socio-economic analysis came from Neumann. His explanations were virtually identical to those in Behemoth, his classic study of Nazism published shortly thereafter. 47 Neumann claimed that antisemitism had negligible influence in Germany, where the Catholic Church was not antisemitic. Neumann's astounding statements about German Catholicism and its attitude toward Jews, along with his declaration that antisemitism was not popular even in Nazi Germany, ranked among the most erroneous dogmatic assertions of the Frankfurt School. In Neumann's Marxist analysis, antisemitism as a popular movement was restricted to the middle classes and was economically based. The new middle class resented and feared Jewish competition, whereas the old, declining middle class saw Jews as the manifestation of the very modern capitalistic system that was destroying their social and economic status. These classes refused to recognize that the real power lay not in the hands of Jews, but in non-Jewish financial and industrial capitalism. Such animosities were aggravated by modern cultural currents (e.g., expressionism, atonal music, and modern theater), that were fostered largely by a Jewish intellectual vanguard and threatened traditional cultural patterns. 48 Most significant for Neumann was the Frankfurt School position that "racism and anti-Semitism [were] substitutes for the class struggle." The image of the Jew as the all-pervasive enemy would serve as the integrating factor overriding class differences in favor of a "racially" based national community. 49 As he later explained to Friedrich, Neumann believed that antisemitism was not aimed at the Jews but at modern society, and especially at the "free middle classes" that prevented the rise of totalitarianism. Antisemitism was a "rehearsal" for the ultimate attack on the middle classes. Thus, as purveyors of antisemitism, these very middle classes were being manipulated toward their own destruction by a propaganda that claimed to save them from the threatening Jew. 50 Likewise, Nazi racial theory provided a justification for an eastward expansion that actually was driven by economic forces. The image of the Jew played an important role in German domination, which depended upon the ability to play off one minority against the other. Although Neumann was unaware of the systematic genocide then occurring in Poland and the East, his August 1941 prognosis was, in retrospect, extraordinarily misguided: "The internal political value of anti-Semitism will, therefore, never allow a complete extermination of the Jews. The foe cannot and must not disappear; he must always be held in readiness to have attributed to him all the evils originating in the socio-political system." 51 Adorno, Horkheimer, and Neumann agreed that the attack on Jews was also a substitute for the ultimate elimination of a Christian morality so ingrained culturally that it could not be confronted directly. Although Adorno cautioned against overplaying the link between antisemitism and anti-Christianity, he acknowledged that "in a deeper sense" there did exist a relationship between Nazi neo-Pagan anti-Christian attitudes and assaults against Jews. To Horkheimer, Western civilization itself emanated from a Christianization of society with an attendant inculcation of the values of human equality, brotherhood, and forgiveness and love of enemies-values that were antithetical to the Nazi naturalistic Weltanschauung. Antisemitism was an unconscious revolt against a Christian morality that repressed primitive impulses, "a kind of revenge for the acceptance of Christianity by striking at its weakest point"-the Jews. 52 Frankfurt School intellectuals were almost alone in attempting to respond to the question of whether there were "specifically Jewish psychological traits." They had already identified this issue in their "Research Project on Anti-Semitism":
A weighty objection might be raised against a thorough scientific treatment of anti-Semitism. In dealing with the deeper mechanisms of anti-Semitism one cannot avoid mentioning things which will not be entirely agreeable to Jews. We are thinking especially of our subsection on the so-called character traits of Jews and the genesis of these traits. One might raise the issue that anti-Semitic propagandists could misuse this and other results of our research. We do not share this point of view. The fear that truth can also be put to bad use should never paralyze the energy needed to uncover it in its entirety, especially in [regard to] such vital problems. 53 However, Horkheimer explained, these "Jewish" psychological traits were not those usually trumped up by antisemites but were "shades of behavior and gesture" emanating from the Jews' historical predicament. The most striking features of the "Jewish mentality" were: "The tendency to resort to rational argument rather than to force; the inclination toward abstract thinking; the transformation of quaestiones facti into quaestiones juris; distrust of any tendency to exalt an existing entity to the rank of the Absolute (skepticism); readiness to confess his fear where others are bound to conceal their weakness." 54 Another remarkable aspect of the Frankfurt School's position was its contention that antisemitism was "not a popular movement in Germany" either historically or under the Nazi regime, but rather was a current "calculatingly manipulated from above." Before 1933, German Jews were, Adorno stated, the minority most assimilated of all, with so-called "Jewish" distinguishing traits having almost completely disappeared and a high rate of intermarriage. In Berlin, one could not distinguish a gentile businessman from a Jewish one. In the Third Reich, the Germans still were "largely indifferent to anti-Semitism." 55 To him, the need occasionally to reinvigorate antisemitism to divert the population's attention from the troubling domestic and foreign situations demonstrated the weakness of German antisemitism. The "Aryanization" of property satisfied popular anti-capitalistic longings without threatening the dominant socio-economic system and its rulers. Neumann even interpreted Kristallnacht as an event calculated to mask the regime's economic assault on small businesses at that time. The gradual pace of the destruction of Jewish economic life (as Adorno saw it), in itself revealed that Nazi antisemitism was merely a "propaganda device." Even the manipulated small businessman was becoming "totally disillusioned" with antisemitism. 56 That this interpretation was promoted by assimilated German Jews who were themselves victims of that system reveals the extent to which the Marxist ideological view of monopolistic capitalism blinded them to the realities of antisemitism; if they had not personally experienced it in Germany before 1933, from abroad they surely had observed it heighten in violence. 57 Yet, the members of the Frankfurt School argued that previous approaches had been ineffective in combating antisemitism because they had failed to recognize the difference between totalitarian and non-totalitarian antisemitism. Non-totalitarian systems (capitalism, Marxism, etc.) retained "remnants of rationality." But totalitarian antisemitism was of an anti-rational and "magical" nature: "The Jew is the incarnation of evil." Given its non-rational character, antisemitism was "immune from any intellectual critique" and beyond any "rational approach." Since it resided psychologically in the subconscious, refuting its contentionsthough occasionally politically useful-could not destroy it. Misperceiving the nature of antisemitism, democratic movements had treated it as merely a "deplorable aberration." They had failed to grasp its broader significance as a non-rational instrument of manipulation in the struggle against democracy and Western civilization and in the fostering of aggressive imperialism. This was particularly true of the most influential German Jewish organization of the time, Der Centralverein deutscher Staatsbü rger jü dischen Glaubens (Central Union of German Citizens of Jewish Faith). The Centralverein had attempted to overcome antisemitism (which it saw as a temporary setback in democratic progress) through assimilation, enlightenment, public education, and "law suits." 58 
Proposed Solutions
Since rational refutation was fruitless, Horkheimer argued, antisemitism could be defeated only by destroying all manifestations of the fascism manipulating it. At home and abroad, this required a "militant policy" of "extirpating fascist sympathies" in the army, the civil service, the press, and other areas of public life. Democratic France had collapsed because it had failed to conduct this purge "in all ways of life." American public opinion now needed to be prepared to accept such measures. Most important, Americans must be convinced that "a strong central government able and willing to take effective action against fascism [was] not incompatible with democracy." 59 The difficulty in confronting antisemitism was one of the most perplexing and divisive questions of the entire Nazi Poison undertaking. While some sought a direct confrontation with antisemitism and its purveyors, others were deeply concerned that such approaches might be counterproductive, making the Jews rather than the Nazis appear to be the problem. And some of the most prominent analysts emphasized that a solution required a change not just in the attitudes and behavior of non-Jews, but in those of Jews as well. Those perceiving the issue in the broad psychosocial terms of human nature tended to be the most pessimistic.
Parsons' interpretation of antisemitism as neurosis determined his prognosis. He believed that, in the short run, a complete cure was highly unlikely. It would require both the thorough assimilation of Jews-to the point of completely eradicating their distinctiveness from the rest of society-or the elimination of the anxiety causing the traditionalists' overreaction to symbols. The best that could be achieved, he felt, was to control the symptoms of this societal neurosis in two ways. Both placed the burden of defusing the situation on the Jews. First, they must avoid or correct situations in which they became a target for displaced aggression. Thus, it would be very dangerous for the Jews to accumulate in areas where they might be perceived as interfering with the economic opportunities of othersespecially in the professions. It was also inadvisable for Jews who already were symbols of the group to occupy prominent public positions; e.g., New York's Governor Herbert Lehman, no matter how qualified, should not run for president. Second, since the traditionalist must be treated as a "neurotic patient," one should never attempt to prove him wrong; even "public discussion of the issue of anti-Semitism [was] almost certain to do more harm than good." Explicit legislative efforts to confront antisemitism or redress Jews' grievances would only intensify antisemitism. Instead, Parsons urged the elimination of discrimination against all groups without any "justificatory explanation" regarding Jews. 60 Allport likewise saw the solution to antisemitism as long-term "education and mental hygiene" for both non-Jews and Jews. It would help, he argued, to inform Jews that due to the teaching of their Orthodox rabbis they, too, were "victims of fictions of racial purity, no less than [were] the Nazis . . . in their belief in the superiority of Aryans." To him, these beliefs on the part of the Jews were a major cause of antisemitism as well as a significant impediment to its elimination. 61 The commentary by Berkeley law professor Max Radin revealed similar sentiments. A strong advocate of defending Jews against discriminatory laws, Radin nonetheless believed it futile to confront irrational anti-Jewish social prejudice. Attempts to expose canards such as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion would remain unsuccessful. Such prejudice, he noted, was the "result of bad home education, and this bad home education is not confined to non-Jews." 62 That Radin, one of America's bestknown scholars of law and legal history, alluded again to Jewish behavior as a source of antisemitism indicates that concern over this factor was not confined to non-Jews. Born in Poland the son of a respected rabbi, Radin embodied both the richness of the Jewish cultural and scholarly tradition and the "progressive" mentality of American and European classical liberal thought.
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Given his august reputation, Radin's commentary carried particular authority on another perplexing question: whether legal remedies should extend beyond upholding the civil rights of Jewish Americans and prohibiting legal discrimination. Both Radin and Hector Holmes, a Boston attorney, opposed the group-libel law approach as limited in effect and perilous for the future civil liberties of all citizens. Jewish communal organizations had long debated the issue of group libel, with the watershed test case being the defamation trial of Henry Ford in the late 1920s. The experience of this trial, in fact, would decisively affect the strategy of the American Jewish Committee in the following decades. Ford's weekly, the Dearborn Independent, had for several years targeted Jews as conspirators of world domination, as reflected in the Protocols. After tense internal struggles, the AJC's leadership had determined that individual suits against Ford would do the Jewish cause more harm than good. A trial would advance Ford's goals by placing the "Jewish Question" on the national agenda, especially if litigation and a national press frenzy lingered for years. In addition, it would create the appearance that Jews were challenging one of America's most cherished constitutional idealsfreedom of speech-and undoubtedly would raise questions about whether they were "true" Americans. Early court rulings favorable to Ford reinforced the sense that such litigation was counterproductive. An underlying assumption of AJC leaders such as Louis Marshall was that Jews had become firmly established in American society, and that they could best sustain their position by proving themselves to be model citizens, abiding by America's laws and devoted to its ideals. Entrenched as they were in American society, Jews were not really threatened by the antisemitism of the fringes-though they could help spread it to the mainstream by retaliating against attacks and defamations. Jews as a group would have to endure indignities so as not to impede the progress made in individual civil rights or undermine the respect of fellow citizens. The AJC thus regarded the behind-the-scenes settlement of the Ford case as vindication of its approach. Even Ford's failure to fulfill essential aspects of that understanding, including ending dissemination of the Protocols, did not shake its confidence that "friendship and goodwill" would prevail over "confrontation and embarrassment." 64 As constitutional lawyers, Radin and Holmes also were well aware that the concept of group libel was not a part of the American legal tradition. The Supreme Court did not uphold a group libel statute until 1952; later the court granted protection for racist speech. To Radin and Holmes, prosecution might even make antisemites into martyrs for free speech. Moreover, because existing laws against violence were sufficient, laws prohibiting violence against specific groups were unnecessary. 65 But their advice conflicted with that of Friedrich, who had vigorously advocated strong executive action in defense of democracy since the Nazi seizure of power. Although Friedrich conceded the Radin-Holmes points on group libel, he still advocated what today would be termed hate-crimes legislation. He cited the New Jersey statute criminalizing incitement of racial hatred; it had been used successfully against the German-American Bund. He also supported pending congressional legislation requiring all distributors and funders of published matter to register. 66 But, Holmes insisted, the problem could not be solved "by statute, any more than we can legislate morality."
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Prominent individuals in the field of business and public relations feared that Friedrich's entire project would turn out to be either useless or even inherently dangerous. Elton Mayo, Friedrich's Harvard colleague and later the author of The Social Problems of Industrial Civilization, believed the pamphlet would merely enhance disharmony by rousing "those who support the unfortunate Jew to a greater fervor of advocacy and those who irrationally object to him to a greater fervor of hostility." 68 Edward L. Bernays, the father of modern public relations and
Freud's nephew, stated bluntly that the pamphlet would aid and abet those seeking to stir discord between Jews and others. To him, the real issue was the defense of civil liberties generally as necessary for the survival of democracy. He severely criticized such "misplaced good-will efforts at setting Americans who are Jews apart and then indicating how good, bad, or indifferent they are." 69 Determining the proper response to antisemitism had long been among the areas of most passionate contention between the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress. Their fundamental differences surfaced especially as various versions of the pamphlet were vetted in both organizations. The American Jewish Committee rejected the psychological interpretations suggesting that antisemitism was "a sort of natural reaction of most people." The Committee also viewed the ongoing wave of American antisemitism as a "foreign importation" of "relatively short duration." Above all, it sought to "avoid public debating of the so-called 'Jewish Question,'" because such debate would fulfill the Nazi objective of making Jews rather Nazism the issue. Any mention of antisemitism, the Committee's leadership felt, must be subsumed under discussion of the general totalitarian threat to America. Perhaps with insufficient appreciation for the depth and indigenous origins of American antisemitism, the Committee pursued a strategy of portraying antisemitism as a "Nazi trick" to divide and weaken America rather than one of confronting charges against Jews. 70 Rothschild referred Friedrich to the general strategy proposed in a pamphlet he had published in 1940: Are American Jews Falling into the Nazi Trap? In it, he chastised "well-meaning but thoughtless Jews" for making the American public "Jew-conscious." Through their protests and broadcasts against antisemites, they had spread antisemitic ideas and created a psychological bandwagon effect. Highlighting or exaggerating the danger of antisemitism "would be almost suicidal," Rothschild wrote. Instead, it was imperative that rabbis and Jews in public life always emphasize that "American Jews are Americans," and act according to the principle of "America first" rather than in the interest of "a particular group."
The focus must not be on Jews, but rather on the questions of civilization versus nihilism, and democracy versus totalitarianism. 71 Truly believing its approach "more realistic," the American Jewish Committee's leadership resented the implicit characterization of their views in an early version of Friedrich's pamphlet as those of the "hush-hush type of Jew, generally well-to-do, who feels he can buy off or manipulate anti-Semitism behind the scenes." 72 The American Jewish Congress, on the other hand, considered the pamphlet of "utmost importance" precisely because such "pussy-footing around" had led to a significant underestimation of the danger antisemitism posed to the American way of life. The Congress accused Rothschild of advocating the view that Jews should let non-Jews do their fighting for them. Moreover, to remain silent in the face of attacks would reveal a lack of self-respect. The Congress felt strongly that Jews must fight on their own behalf, not only through current Jewish organizational activities but also as part of a more intensive government and societal initiative. The government should establish a special department to counter Nazi propaganda. Rather than downplaying antisemitism, as Rothschild suggested, the Congress advocated uncovering it and fighting it directly. Unfortunately, neither the press nor radio had taken its duties seriously in this regard, with the press actually "suppressing rather than exposing the anti-Semitic menace." Similarly, both the Catholic Church and public school systems needed to overcome their indifference or avoidance, and actively work to eradicate the problem. As part of that process, myths and factual misrepresentations about Jews needed to be refuted.
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Dissension to the End With factual modifications, all other Jewish organizations consulted strongly endorsed the thrust of the pamphlet, tending toward the more activist position of the American Jewish Congress and Rabbi Stephen Wise of the Free Synagogue. Among these organizations were the Anti-Defamation League, the General Jewish Council, and the Jewish Labor Committee, as well as individuals such as the prominent Columbia University historian Salo Baron. 74 The only rejection of the pamphlet came from the National Conference of Christians and Jews, which refused to cooperate in the pamphlet's distribution. Although Louis Minsky, a leading Jewish figure in the organization, relayed the Conference's reservations, the Council for Democracy surmised that the Conference's criticism emanated "largely from a Catholic reading" of the pamphlet. The Council regarded the objections as a kind of censorship through "hairsplitting," to which it would not submit. Nonetheless, this reaction from an organization dedicated to Jewish-Christian understanding once again clearly indicated the difficulty Jews faced in their effort to approach Christian antisemitism without alienating Christians as a community.
However, Jewish groups unanimously objected to original phrasings in sections on assimilation, and these subsequently were revised. Although consultants such as Parsons and Graeber were certain that prejudice had appreciably inhibited assimilation, they remained tentative regarding the future of American Jewry after several generations outside the ghetto without persecution. 75 Several Jewish groups rejected the notion that persecution and the sometimes self-imposed traditional restraints of the ghetto were the factors that had sustained Jewish identity and slowed assimilation. They particularly objected to early language suggesting that the elimination of antisemitic prejudice or discrimination might result in the "virtual disappearance of Jewry itself" or that the best advice for those preferring that Jews disappear was "to leave them alone." 76 Ultimately, the pamphlet skirted the assimilation question, noting simply that persecutions had "help[ed] perpetuate the Jewish people," but that the impact of generations with "unrestricted contact with the world" remained unknown.
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Internal dissension among the Council staff over the thematic thrust of the pamphlet continued until the very point of publication. In the end, the piece's title read: Nazi Poison: How We Can Destroy Hitler's Propaganda Against the Jews. Antisemitism as the "spearhead of Nazism" was the pamphlet's primary theme. Indeed, it stated, Jews were not the issue. In fact, the Council insisted it had addressed antisemitism only because the Nazis had seized upon this universal phenomenon as a "stealthy poison" with which to destroy democracy. Therefore, in combating antisemitism, the ordinary "Mr. Smith" was "fighting for his own interests." Behind indigenous American fascists and "hate outfits" stood Nazi agents and propaganda. The German-American Bund, William Pelley's Silver Shirts, Father Coughlin, Charles Lindbergh, and others of their ilk were isolationists who advanced the fallacious Nazi argument that this was "a war for the Jews."
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Americans were susceptible to this poison, the pamphlet stated, because long-standing myths about Jews could be exploited in times of anxiety and insecurity. A section titled "Fact-Not Fiction" refuted misconceptions about Jewish influence and control in business, labor, the press, the film industry, and the professions. The pamphlet characterized those who railed against the dangers posed by refugees as either "uninformed or troublemakers." It presented Christianity and antisemitism as "completely antithetical" to each other. Despite earlier antisemitism among some German churchmen, it asserted, the churches had now realized that antisemitism was the first stage in the Nazi assault on the churches and Christianity. Nazis attacked Jews as the weakest point in the Judeo-Christian cultural foundations of Western civilization; the assault on the churches was to follow. Ultimately, the Nazis sought "to crush freedom, reason, and justice." The pamphlet reiterated that antisemitism was not a problem of Jews and had little to do with them. All of humanity was at stake. Everyone should oppose this fascist trick of the "Fifth Columnists" out of "personal interest." After all, the authors exclaimed, "what suckers we'd be if we fell for it!" 79 Americans could meet this challenge to democracy through various forms of speech and action, starting with a purge of their anti-Jewish cultural vocabulary. Non-Jews should also vigorously protest antisemitic slurs, and boycott businesses with anti-Jewish restrictions in services or hiring. Educators should learn how to combat propaganda and prejudice in literature and the media, and teachers with anti-democratic proclivities should be dismissed. The churches likewise needed to educate their teachers and clergy to enable them to discuss crucial issues such as the crucifixion of Christ and the Judaic roots of Christianity in a new way. Interdenominational groups needed to promote dialogues aimed at mutual understanding. These, not government programs, constituted the effective antidote to "Nazi poison." 80 Although in its assertiveness the pamphlet ignored the warning of the American Jewish Committee, it had made concessions to the AJC on its recommendations about what American Jews should do. Without saying so explicitly, it implied that while non-Jews should challenge all manifestations of antisemitism, Jews should follow the moderate advice in Rothschild's pamphlet. They should assume that their decent Christian neighbors were not antisemites. They should teach their children to be proud as Jews but, equally important, to perform their "full duties as American citizens." Above all, they needed to avoid being provoked into reacting against Nazi-incited antisemitism and making Jews the issue: "Let sober judgment, not righteous indignation, control your actions." 81 
Conclusion
In its pamphlet, the Council for Democracy had made a valiant effort to reconcile diverse views and interests while reaching out to those very segments of American society imbued with antisemitic sentiments. But events soon overtook this effort, as the United States entered the war before this publication was in press. A disclaimer published in it conceded that some of those the pamphlet associated with fascism already had declared their support for the war. Although it also asserted that the war had made the identification of Nazi divisive tactics an even more urgent necessity, the "spearhead" thesis that antisemitism was a foreign import clearly had been undermined by the patriotic rallying that followed the declaration of war. The concept became even less viable during the war years, as a rising nationalistic fervor and a formidable consensus against foreign anti-democratic forces coexisted with a strong indigenous American antisemitism. 82 Serious differences over how to deal with antisemitism at home and abroad continued throughout the war, and have persisted down to current debates over the U.S. response to the Holocaust. 83 The opinions expressed in the Friedrich study demonstrate that these differences were not limited to Jewish advocacy groups such as the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress. Some non-Jews also believed it necessary to downplay any relationship between the war Americans might have to fight and the Nazi oppression of Jews. When such connections between Nazis, Jews, and war could not be avoided, so the argument went, they should be presented not in the context of a humanitarian effort to assist or rescue Jews, but purely as the pursuit of Americans' "selfinterest." This decision in itself strongly implied that American antisemitism was more pervasive and virulent than Friedrich and other participants recognized or were willing to concede. The pamphlet exemplified the general underestimation among both non-Jewish liberals and significantly assimilated Jews of the extent of indigenous American antisemitism. While acknowledging that antisemitism had made "some inroads" in America, these observers naively failed to grasp how deeply rooted it was among large numbers of average American Catholics and Protestants. 84 And nowhere did the pamphlet even hint at the depth of antisemitism among many of the elites who dominated the country's most important public and private institutions. 85 Several prominent contributors to this project themselves reflected some of the negative sentiments about Jews found in the general population, especially in discussions regarding certain "Jewish" characteristics and behavior, as well as in those on the desirability of the assimilation-or even the "disappearance" of the Jews as a distinct community. The tone and content of certain of these remarks about Jews were either implicitly or blatantly antisemitic. Moreover, given what recent scholarship has revealed about European religious figures and institutions during the Holocaust, the pamphlet's depictions of Catholic and Protestant Churches as strong opponents of Nazism and potential allies in the struggle against antisemitism certainly appear foolish. 86 Likewise, the Frankfurt School seriously misunderstood the origin, nature, and extent of an indigenous German antisemitism, as well as its deadly implications under a Nazi-controlled state. Nonetheless, the spearhead theory of antisemitism did not disappear after this well-intentioned though poorly conceived pamphlet found its potential impact thwarted by the outbreak of war. At the very point when the Nazi genocide of Europe's Jews was being revealed, the spearhead theory was becoming a cornerstone of the Frankfurt School's interpretation of antisemitism. 87 Even after he became aware of the mass exterminations, Neumann failed to grasp the deadly seriousness with which the Nazis held to their paranoid visions of Jews as the ultimate deadly enemy. In the appendix to the second edition (1944) of his influential book, he wrote: "It follows that in this Anti-Semitic ideology and practice the extermination of the Jews is only the means to the attainment of the ultimate objective, namely the destruction of free institutions, beliefs, and groups. This may be called the spearhead theory of Anti-Semitism." 88 Although at the time the Frankfurt School had only a limited impact on American academia, in the long run the intellectual prestige of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Neumann ensured that their ideas would significantly influence perceptions of antisemitism, and debates about its role in the Holocaust, for decades to come. 89 More immediately, the wartime American government presumed that these German-born experts-themselves Jewish victims of Nazism-held a certain intimate, perhaps unique, knowledge of this subject that gave their views particular credibility and authority. Neumann and several other Frankfurt School intellectuals served in the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Neumann's Behemoth was the foundation of that section's various analyses of National Socialism, none of which revealed a true understanding of the Nazi policy of genocide. By the end of the war, Neumann had acquired a reputation as the leading authority on the subject within the American government. And though these OSS é migré intellectuals had little influence on the conduct of the war, they did impact the immediate postwar situation, as Neumann and others became consultants in the research and analysis section of the war crimes staff. Once again, Behemoth provided the framework for their work on the criminal case against the Nazi system. This was quite evident in the brief they prepared on the extermination of European Jewry, which constituted nothing less than an explicit reiteration of the details and arguments of the spearhead theory of antisemitism, without any adjustment in light of revelations of the enormity of the Holocaust. 90 In contributing to Nazi Poison, a number of other well-intentioned, leading political scientists, sociologists, and other opinion-makers (all sympathetic to the Jews' plight) also had denied the perilous peculiarity of the Jews within Nazi ideology and policy. Some may have taken this public stand out of a sincere belief that Jews were merely a useful "instrument" serving the Nazi goal of destroying Western Christian civilization and democracy. For others, universalizing the Jewish predicament so that it would represent American interests and the welfare of humanity was a necessary strategic maneuver to raise opposition to fascism without intensifying indigenous sentiments against Jews. In both cases, however, the spearhead theory reinforced the broader American wartime attitude regarding the Jews. If such esteemed authorities and public figures could downplay the importance of Jews within Nazi anti-Jewish policy, then it became easier for others to underestimate-even deny-the extent of the Nazis' persecution of Jews. It also undoubtedly helped precondition the formidable sense of disbelief once information about the exterminations began to seep out.
Moreover, the spearhead theory was perfectly suited to a public and governmental attitude that underlay an American policy of relative inaction regarding the rescue of European Jews during and after the Holocaust. It added weight to the objections of those generally opposed to such intervention, as well as to claims that the Jews were seeking special treatment. If this was a universal war for humanity in which antisemitism was a mere propaganda device and "had precious little to do with Jews," then all groups were equal targets and victims of Nazi barbarity. Such perspectives helped rationalize, within the general public as well as within governmental institutions, resistance to involvement.
This resistance was reflected in a variety of responses: for instance, the army and the state department were reluctant to cooperate with the War Refugee Board; early army articles revealing the horrors of concentration camps never mentioned the word "Jew"; and U.S. officials apparently failed to recognize that traumatized Holocaust survivors had been singled out for extermination and therefore required special attention. Ironically, though the Nazis had not perceived the extermination of Jews primarily as the spearhead of a broader policy of conquest and domination, wartime American and é migré perpetuation of such a theory may have contributed to an atmosphere inhibiting efforts to counter the Nazi persecutions. However, these observers' misconceptions about antisemitism, like the unintended consequences of misguided efforts to counter it, should not be construed as indications of lack of courage among Jewish Americans or their elites. A deep faith in America, combined with anxiety about increasing antisemitism, may well have engendered wishful thinking that blinded them to what would, in retrospect, become evident about American antisemitism. But all those involved pursued a forceful strategy that they felt was necessitated by the specific American predicament and the dilemmas facing Jewish Americans. Their beliefs, too, were products of the ambivalence, ambiguities, and contradictions that had historically characterized relations between Jews and non-Jews in the United States before the Holocaust. 
Notes

